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1A Proof-of-Quality-Factor (PoQF) based Blockchain
and Edge Computing for Vehicular Message
Dissemination
Ferheen Ayaz, Student Member, IEEE, Zhengguo Sheng, Senior Member, IEEE, Daxin Tian, Senior
Member, IEEE and Yong Liang Guan, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Blockchain applications in vehicular networks can
offer many advantages including decentralization and improved
security. However, most of consensus algorithms in blockchain
are difficult to be implemented in a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANET) without the help of edge computing services. For
example, the connectivity in VANET only remains for a short
period of time, which is not sufficient for highly time consuming
consensus algorithms, e.g., Proof-of-Work, running on mobile
edge nodes (vehicles). Other consensus algorithms also have some
drawbacks, e.g. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is biased towards nodes with
higher amount of stakes and Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET) is
not highly secure against malicious nodes. For these reasons, we
propose a voting blockchain based on Proof-of-Quality-Factor
(PoQF) consensus algorithm, where threshold number of votes is
controlled by edge computing servers. Specifically, PoQF includes
voting for message validation and a competitive relay selection
process based on probabilistic prediction of channel quality
between transmitter and receiver. The performance bounds of
failure and latency in message validation are obtained. The paper
also analyzes the throughput of block generation, as well as the
asymptotic latency, security and communication complexity of
PoQF. An incentive distribution mechanism to reward honest
nodes and punish malicious nodes is further presented and its
effectiveness against collusion of nodes is proved using game
theory. Simulation results show that PoQF reduces failure in
validation by 11% and 15% as compared to PoS and PoET,
respectively, and is 68 ms faster than PoET.
Index Terms—blockchain, PoS, PoET, PBFT, edge computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
VEHICLES equipped with on-board computers offer lim-ited computing and storage capabilities. However, in a
vehicular edge computing (VEC) network, the mobile edge
nodes (vehicles) with limited resources are able to offload
heavy computational tasks to nearby Road Side Units (RSUs).
One of the main objectives of VEC is to support infotainment
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TABLE I: VANET issues & opportunities using blockchain.
Issues in VANET Blockchain-based Solutions
False message generation Consensus for validation
Privacy requirement Cryptographic keys
Broadcast storm / relay selection Leader election
Need of economic model Incentives for block generation
Trust without third party required Decentralization
applications and ensure road safety. However, due to high
mobility of nodes and changing transmission rates, there are a
large number of communications failures and delays between
mobile nodes and RSUs [1]. For delay-sensitive applications,
such as, emergency message dissemination, VEC allows nodes
to exchange messages among themselves in a decentralized
manner, forming a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET). On
the other hand, a blockchain is a distributed ledger which
can record transactions in a trusted and credible environment
without the requirement of a central authority. The fea-
tures of blockchain, such as distributed nature, independence
from third party and consensus to validate transactions, are
some of the essential requirements of message dissemination
in VANET. Therefore, the combination of blockchain and
VANET can potentially result in secure and reliable vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) communications [2]. Table I summarizes
challenges associated with message dissemination in VANETs
and corresponding solutions provided by blockchain. However,
the dynamic network nature of VANET limits the connectivity
between two nodes to a short period of time. Moreover,
technical challenges, such as broadcast storm, packet collision
and computing complexity need to be addressed in VANET
environment while implementing blockchain [3]. Therefore,
new blockchain solutions need to be developed using VEC
networks for fully utilizing blockchain framework.
The consensus algorithm in a blockchain is used for trusting
a transaction. Nodes undergo a validation process, termed as
consensus, before recording a transaction in a block. The nodes
participating in a consensus are mining nodes and the node
which successfully generates a block is known as leader [4].
One of the most popular consensus algorithms is Proof-of-
Work (PoW), in which all nodes attempt to find a solution
to a hash puzzle. The node which finds the solution first is
elected as a leader, it will add next block to the blockchain and
earn mining incentive. The computation cost to find a solution
of a hash puzzle takes around ten minutes [5]. Distribution
2of huge computation load of PoW over the edge system is
recommended as a solution but evaluation of cost and contri-
bution of individual edge device in a heterogeneous network
is still unexplored [6]. A number of time-saving alternatives
to PoW have also been proposed. One of the most commonly
used consensus algorithms with connected vehicles is Proof-
of-Stake (PoS), where the reputation of a node is considered
as stake [7], [8]. PoS reduces the latency of a consensus but
does not provide a fair competition to elect a leader. It is biased
towards nodes with higher amount of stakes. The fairness with
less computation workload is achieved by another consensus
algorithm, known as Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET), in which
each node generates a random number to determine the waiting
time after which it can generate a block. However, existing
literature proves its weakness in security and vulnerability in
the presence of malicious nodes [9]. The Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus algorithm which requires
at least 2f + 1 votes to validate a transaction, where f is
the number of faulty nodes [10], is suggested to be suitable
for vehicular applications because of its high throughput and
ability to negotiate message validity [11], [12]. It is analogous
to threshold based message validation in which a message is
considered valid only if it is confirmed by a threshold number
of nodes located in a close proximity of a sender [13]. The
threshold value is crucial in such validation. A low threshold
value may lead to false validation, whereas a high threshold
value can result in increased latency. However, a threshold
based message validation can be made efficient if the threshold
value is adaptable to network conditions and requirements
and can be varied using edge computing resources. It can be
summarized that the measurements required to evaluate the
performance of a consensus algorithm are
• Security: number of malicious nodes it can control with-
out altering the original validity status of a transaction
and its ability to resolve forks and prevent cheating.
• Validation latency: time required to validate a transaction.
• Throughput: number of blocks generated per second.
This paper proposes a Proof-of-Quality-Factor (PoQF) con-
sensus algorithm for vehicular networks, where the message
validation and Quality Factor in determining multi-hop re-
laying can be run efficiently on mobile edge nodes in a
decentralized manner. For a successful packet transmission,
Signal to Interference Noise Ratio (SINR) plays a crucial role
[14], [15]. Therefore, SINR is considered as a metric in relay
node selection. As SINR depends on the distances among
nodes which vary with time in vehicular networks, the proba-
bility that SINR exceeds a certain threshold is predicted using
mobility models in which positions or distances are regarded
as random variables following some probability distribution
[16]. The main contributions of the paper are
• We propose a PoQF consensus, where mobile edge nodes
serve as mining nodes. Instead of solving a hash puzzle,
they select relays along with validating a message.
• We derive the bounds of failure and latency in validating
a message as well as the throughput of block genera-
tion. The asymptotic latency, security and communication
complexity of PoQF are also discussed.
TABLE II: Consensus algorithms used in VANETs.
Purpose Consensus
Consensus run by RSUs PoW [8], [31], [38]
Use of edge computing PoW [37]
Trust / reputation management PoS / DPoS [7], [8], [40]
Message Validation PBFT [12], [29], [30], [35], [41], [42]
Achieving high throughput PBFT [11], [31], PoS [36]
• We propose an incentive distribution mechanism to re-
ward honest nodes and punish malicious mining nodes
and analyze its performance using game theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the related work. Section III explains the proposed
blockchain design. The theoretical performance of our work
is analyzed in Section IV. Simulation results are discussed in
Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Vehicular Edge Computing (VEC)
In [1], the challenges in VEC such as transmission failures
and delays during offloading are addressed and a context-
aware opportunistic offloading scheme utilizing fog computing
is proposed. VEC is recommended as an efficient support
to emerging applications such as Artificial Intelligence (AI),
Software Define Network (SDN) and blockchain in [17]. The
advantages of combining mobile edge computing, Internet of
Vehicles (IoV) and AI are highlighted in [18] and [19]. Both
of them suggest Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) as the
key technique to bring intelligence in VEC networks. Collo-
cating edge computing servers with radio access networks for
satisfying latency requirements of message dissemination in
IoV is proposed in [20]. In [21], the problem of inappropriate
utilization of resources is resolved by blockchain.
B. Collective Mining
Existing literature aims to achieve a better performance of
blockchain consensus, at the same time retaining its feature of
decentralization. One of the solutions to improve validation
latency and throughput in block generation is to introduce
collective mining. In this scheme, multiple mining nodes
collectively decide whether a transaction is valid and should
be added to a blockchain [22]. Byzcoin is an example of
collective mining [23]. It leads to parallel blockchain extension
and the mining incentive is shared among all mining nodes.
Bitcoin-NG [24] divides time into multiple slots. In each slot,
a leader can append transactions until a new leader is elected.
There are two types of blocks in Bitcoin-NG: keyblock and
microblock. The leader is elected by solving a cryptographic
puzzle. The keyblock stores the solution of hash puzzle and
the microblock contains ledger entries. Another approach of
collective mining is called sharding in which mining nodes are
grouped into committees and work in parallel. Each committee
runs PBFT consensus on different set of transactions (shards)
at the same time for achieving a high throughput [25].
3C. Blockchain based Incentive Distribution
Blockchain based economic model for incentive distribution
in federated learning utilizing edge computing framework
is recommended in [6]. Secure blockchain based incentive
mechanisms are also proposed in literature to encourage coop-
erative message delivery and data sharing in distributed peer-
to-peer (P2P) applications. In [26], a pricing strategy to ensure
successful message delivery using blockchain is presented and
proved to be secure against collusion of intermediate nodes and
receiver using game theory. It is proposed to verify transactions
of incentives distributed among relay nodes by mining nodes.
Similarly, in [27], P2P data sharing using public blockchain is
proposed. Its incentive mechanism is analyzed by evolutionary
game model and the cooperative behavior of nodes is analyzed
by repeated game model. In both [26] and [27], the incentive
mechanism is proved to encourage cooperation among nodes
by including a charge mandatory to be paid by transmitting
nodes. Incentive based message relaying in distributed P2P
applications using blockchain is also proposed in [28] and
proved to be secure against selfish behavior. In [26] - [28],
the incentive distribution among relay nodes is proposed,
but the incentive for mining nodes to promote participation
and the type of consensus algorithm to be processed are
not discussed. In [29] and [30], the incentive based message
delivery in wireless ad-hoc networks for smart cities and
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is presented, where
message is validated using PBFT, and the incentives and
privacy are controlled using blockchain. In [31], a blockchain
based data sharing in VANETs is proposed. PoW is used by
Road Side Units (RSUs) to add a data block, whereas PBFT
is used by vehicle nodes for block announcement.
D. Blockchain based Vehicular Communications
In [32], blockchain is proposed for decentralization, data
security and privacy in IoV and technical difficulties to im-
plement blokchchain in IoV, such as, high speed of moving
vehicles and error-prone wireless transmission links, are dis-
cussed. In [33], these technical difficulties are suggested to
be solved using DRL for altering block size and interval.
Blockchain is also recommended for privacy preserving and
efficient database management in railway vehicles [34].
Selection of blockchain consensus suited to IoV is widely
discussed in literature. PBFT is recommended as a suitable
consensus for message validation among connected vehicles
in [12], [33] and [35]. Meanwhile, PoS is also compared with
PoW and suggested as a promising consensus for IoV because
of its low energy consumption and reduced time delay in
[36]. A blockchain based message dissemination in VANETs
utilizing edge computing is proposed in [37]. It uses PoW and
achieves latency reduction in block generation by offloading
complex computations to capable edge devices. Its blockchain
is used to store trust values of nodes, which is updated
according to the validity of message initiated by the individual
node. Similarly, [38] also proposes a blockchain to store
trust values and message ratings, where hash computations
are performed by RSUs. On the contrary, [39] shows that a
completely distributed P2P blockchain in VANETs with least
possible reliance on RSU and infrastructure is not possible to
be implemented with PoW, but an RSU-dependent network
will be a costly solution. A joint PoW and PoS consensus
managed by RSUs is proposed in [8] to store trust values of
nodes and evaluate the credibility of message based on trust
value of senders. Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) is proposed
in [7], where only selected nodes take part in consensus.
The mining nodes are selected on the basis of reputation.
This approach is based on the assumption that RSUs with
edge computing infrastructures have sufficient computation
and storage resources to process and store reputation of all
nodes. DPoS is also used for blockchain-enabled data sharing
during rescue missions in disaster-affected areas, where IoV
is assisted by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) [40].
The prior work related to blockchain in VANETs mostly
focus on credibility based message validation. In [2], the
impact of high mobility on blockchain based VANETs is eval-
uated, but a cost-effective solution to overcome this challenge
is still needed. A consolidated solution integrating message
validation and dissemination using PBFT based consensus,
blockchain based incentives and reputation management is
presented in [41] and [42], but a detailed performance analysis
is required so as to evaluate its practical feasibility. This paper
analyzes both theoretical and simulation based performance of
the voting blockchain incorporating relay node selection and
incentive mechanism supported by edge computing server. In
addition to the mobility constraint in VANETs, the perfor-
mance analysis also examines the practical feasibility of the
proposed solution with varying number of mining and mali-
cious nodes. Based on existing literature, Table II summarizes
different consensus algorithms used for various purposes in
VANETs and indicates multiple advantages of PBFT including
message validation by voting, high throughput and ability to
finalize transactions independently without relying RSU.
III. SYSTEM MODELING AND THE PROPOSED
BLOCKCHAIN DESIGN
This section describes PoQF consensus including relay node
selection, QFi calculations, adversary model and incentive
distribution mechanism. Key notations used in this paper are
listed in Table III. As categorized in [43], we define edge
devices present in the network into two types: the mobile
edge “nodes”, i.e., vehicles and “edge computing servers”, i.e.,
RSUs. Before joining the blockchain network, a node needs to
register itself and acquire a wallet address and a pair of pub-
lic and private keys for privacy-preserving communications.
This can be accomplished by Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communications with regulation authorities via a nearby edge
computing server. Each node updates its copy of blockchain
through edge caching, as described in [44]. The regulation au-
thorities control the expiration of idle keys, thereby preventing
long-range attacks in which attackers use old accounts [45].
A. The Proposed PoQF Consensus
The proposed PoQF consists of four stages, as illustrated in
Fig. 1. At the first stage, an incident occurs and a message is
initiated by originator involved in the incident. An originator
4TABLE III: Key Notations.
Notation Description
di,j Distance between node i and j
dminneigh Minimum distance between neighbors nodes
dminhop Minimum hop distance
nhop Hop number
nth Threshold number of votes
ntr Number of simultaneous transmissions
nitf , nneigh Number of interference, neighbor nodes
nmn Number of mining nodes
nm, nh Number of malicious, honest nodes
µm, µh Mean number of malicious, honest nodes
pm Probability of malicious nodes
pt Average transmission probability
psuc, pcol Probability of success, collided transmission
pidle Probability of node encountering idle slot
τi Validation time of node i
aτi , bτi Lower, upper limit of τi
ticd Time at which incident message is received
Tdelay Time delay to finalize consensus
Tslot Time slot in MAC layer
Tsuc, Tcol Time for success, collided transmission
TDIFS , TSIFS Time intervals for DIFS, SIFS
TCTS , TACK , TRTS Time intervals for DCF related operations
Tavg Average length of a time slot in DCF
TMB Time to transmit a microblock
Teyp Time to encrypt a keyblock
L Length of a packet
W Window size
C Transmission rate
λMAC , λKB MAC, Keyblock throughput
α Path loss exponent
β Threshold of SINR
γ Number of nodes per square meter
R Transmission range
κ Consensus parameter
vi Velocity of node i
σ2i Variance of vi
QFi, DFi Quality, Distance Factor of node i
SINRi,j SINR between node i and j
Pnoise Noise Power
Q(SINRi) Quality of node i’s SINR
Bi Behavior of mining node i
CCmn, CCr Call Compensation for mining, relay nodes
Ui Utility of node i
TC Transaction Charge
FV Failure in Validation
is the sender s of the message at first hop, i.e., when nhop = 1,
where nhop is the hop number. The message is analogous to
a transaction proposal in a consensus that requires validation.
At the second stage, a node which receives and responds to
the message performs the role of mining node. Each mining
node i generates a microblock, in which it records its vote
towards validity of the message and its Quality Factor, QFi,
to become a potential relay node. A node i waits for time τi
before it announces a microblock. τi is a randomly generated
number following uniform distribution, i.e., τi ∼ U(aτi , bτi),
where aτi and bτi are lower and upper limits of τi, respectively,
which are dependent on QFi. The motivation behind using τi
is three fold: one is to prevent all nodes from transmitting
at the same time and causing packet collision, second is to
introduce fairness by giving less waiting time to nodes with
higher QFi and the third is to ensure randomization if node
i and node j have QFi = QFj . Using uniform distribution
to randomize scheduling of messages so as to avoid packet
collision has been previously used in literature [46].
At the third stage, node i is selected as a relay node if
it fulfills two conditions. First, it has received at least nth
microblocks with the same votes as its own. Second, its QFi
is the highest among all microblocks with the same votes as
its own. The motivation behind these two conditions instead
of QFi only is to enhance security of PoQF. For example, if
a malicious node i with the highest QFi among all mining
nodes votes false for an originally true message and receives
nth microblocks with true votes, it cannot become a relay
node and earn incentive. Similarly, if an honest node i with the
highest QFi votes false for an originally false message, but
receives nth microblocks with true votes, it cannot become
a relay node to forward a false message. A relay node will
forward the message only if it is validated as true but always
generate a keyblock to record message validity after PoQF
and transactions, which are related to incentive distribution. As
shown in Fig. 2, if no node receives at least nth microblocks
with the same votes as its own until 1s, i.e. the maximum
allowable latency for emergency message dissemination [47],
the message is considered as false and a keyblock to record
such transaction will be generated by the mining node i
with highest QFi, which voted false. If two relay nodes with
opposing votes are selected (one with true vote and another
with false vote), the message is considered true so that the
cooperation may not be stopped in case of a true incident.
The value of nth corresponding to real traffic conditions is
communicated to nodes by an edge computing server.
The fourth stage is continuation of message dissemination.
If the message is validated as true, it is disseminated after
a new relay node selection by PoQF at each hop until
nhop ≤ nmaxhop , where nmaxhop is the maximum number of hops
up to which a message is required to be forwarded and is
updated by an edge computing server. It is noted that votes to
validate a message are not required for nhop > 1. It is simply
because the validation of message has been done by adjacent
witness nodes (mining nodes at nhop = 1) through a camera
or location/speed verification [48]. All other nodes beyond the
first hop may not have access to validate the originator.
5Fig. 1: The proposed PoQF consensus.
B. QFi Calculations
QFi determines the quality of mining node i at the time
when it forwards the message as a relay node. Each node
regularly shares its position and velocity via beacon message.
As shown in Fig. 1, two consecutive beacons messages are
exchanged at t0 and t1 before the occurrence of incident. To
compute QFi, node i makes probability based predictions of
distances with its neighbor nodes at time t2 = ticd + T delay,
where ticd is the time at which the incident message is received
from the sender s (originator or previous relay node) and
T delay is the mean time delay to finalize consensus and is
described in details in Section IV. As QFi decides the relay
node, it is governed by two factors [49]: the probability of
success that a node’s transmission can reach to all of its
neighbor nodes, i.e., Quality of SINR at t2, Q(SINRt2i ),
and the probability that its distance to the sender s is larger
than a threshold for ensuring successful transmission over
longer distances, i.e., Distance Factor at t2, DF t2i . Hence,
QFi = Q(SINR
t2
i ) ·DF t2i .
1) Q(SINRt2i ): If node i becomes a relay node, the SINR
of a signal received at node j from node i at t2 is
SINRi,j =
(di,j)
−α
Pnoise + Σ
nitf
k=1,k 6=i(dj,k)−α
, (1)
where α is the path loss exponent and its value depends on
fading environment [16], di,j is the distance between node i
and node j, dj,k is the distance between node j and interfering
node k, nitf is the number of interference nodes and Pnoise
is the noise power. For a successful message transmission, it
is required that the SINR exceeds a certain threshold β, i.e.,
SINRi,j ≥ β. The probability that SINRi,j ≥ β at t2, i.e.,
Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β) is given as
Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β)
= Pr
( (dt2i,j)−α
Pnoise + Σ
nitf
k=1,k 6=i(d
t2
j,k)
−α ≥ β
)
= Pr
(
dt2i,j ≤
(
β(Pnoise + Σ
nitf
k=1,k 6=i(d
t2
j,k)
−α)
)− 1α),
(2)
where dt2i,j = d
t1
i,j + ∆d
∆t
i,j is the distance between node i and
node j at t2 and ∆d∆ti,j is the relative distance change between
Fig. 2: Flowchart of actions by mining node at nhop = 1.
node i and node j during ∆t = t2 − t1. dt1i,j can be obtained
from the beacon message received at t1 and the expected value
of ∆d∆ti,j can be found using Probability Density Function
(PDF) of standard Gaussian distribution. Referring to the
results in [16], [50] and [51], the velocity of a node i follows
a standard Gaussian distribution, i.e., vi ∼ N (0, σ2i t), where
σ2i =
(v
t1
i −v
t0
i )
2
t1−t0 is variance of vi and v
t0
i , v
t1
i denote vi at t0
and t1, respectively, which are shared by node i via beacon
messages. ∆d∆ti,j is defined as
∆d∆ti,j = (v
t1
i − vt1j + ∆v∆ti −∆v∆tj )∆t, (3)
where ∆v∆t is the change in velocity during ∆t. By the
principle of linear combination of Gaussian variables, ∆v∆ti ∼
N (0, σ2i∆t), ∆v∆ti −∆v∆tj ∼ N (0, (σ2i +σ2j )∆t) and hence,
∆d∆ti,j ∼ N (0, (σ2i + σ2j )∆t3). If vt2i is not known, (2) can be
calculated by assuming ∆d∆ti,j as a standard Gaussian variable.
Each node i calculates (2) with respect to its neighbor
node j. As nitf is the number of neighbors of node j
except node i, nitf and dt2j,k are unknown to node i. It can
estimate the expected values to find Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β).
Hence
(
β(Pnoise + Σ
nitf
k=1,k 6=i(d
t2
j,k)
−α)
)− 1α in (2) can be
rewritten as
(
β
(
Pnoise + E(nitf )E(d
t2
j,k)
−α
))− 1α
, where
E(.) denotes expected value. The location of nodes on road
is assumed to follow an independent homogeneous spatial
Poisson distribution with density parameter γ nodes / m2 on
a two dimensional road segment with no separation of lanes
in order to make it general and allow dynamic movement
of nodes [2]. Therefore, E(nitf ) can be estimated as the
number of vehicles within the transmission range of node j.
Assuming that transmission range of each node is a uniform
circular area with radius R, E(nitf ) can be calculated as
6the number of nodes inside the area excluding node i, i.e.,
E(nitf ) =
∑piR2γ
k=1
(
(piR2γ)k
k! e
−piR2γ
)
− 1, where γ is pre-
defined and known to each node. It is noted that an adaptive
γ corresponding to real traffic conditions is out of the scope
of this paper, but can be locally estimated by calculating the
number of received beacons [52] or with the use of edge
computing servers [53].
Lemma 1: E(dt2j,k) =
2
3R2 (R
3 − dminneigh3), where dminneigh is
the minimum allowed distance between two neighbor nodes.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1: Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β)
=

1
2
(
erf
(
∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i+σ
2
j )∆t
3
)
− erf
(
−∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i+σ
2
j )∆t
3
))
,
if dt1i,j ≤ dx,
1− 12
(
erf
(
∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i+σ
2
j )∆t
3
)
− erf
(
−∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i+σ
2
j )∆t
3
))
,
otherwise,
where dx =
(
β
(
Pnoise + E(nitf )E(d
t2
j,k)
−α
))− 1α
.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Q(SINRt2i ) =
∑j=nneigh
j=1 Pr(SINR
t2
i,j ≥ β), where nneigh
is the number of neighbors of node i whose position and
velocities are exchanged through beacon messages.
2) DF t2i : It is the probability that one hop distance be-
tween node i and the sender s is larger than a minimum
threshold, dminhop , and is defined as
DF t2i = Pr(d
t2
i,s > d
min
hop ) = 1− Pr(dt2i,s ≤ dminhop ), (4)
where Pr(dt2i,s ≤ dminhop ) can be found by using the same
calculation as described in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1: The range of QFi is 0 ≤ QFi ≤ nneigh.
Proof: Q(SINRt2i ) is a sum of Pr(SINR
t2
i,j), for
all neighbor nodes of i. Therefore, the possible range of
Q(SINRt2i ) is 0 ≤ Q(SINRt2i ) ≤ nneigh. According
to (4), the possible range of DF t2i is 0 ≤ DF t2i ≤ 1.
As QFi = Q(SINRt2i ) · DF t2i , it can be concluded that
0 ≤ QFi ≤ nneigh.
C. Adversary Model
It is assumed that all edge computing servers in VEC
network are honest. Let nmn be the number of mobile edge
nodes taking part as mining nodes in a PoQF consensus out of
which nm nodes are malicious and nh nodes are honest when
nhop = 1. A malicious node in the proposed blockchain design
is defined as the node voting against the original validity of
a message, that is, if a message is true, the malicious node
will vote false and vice-versa. Let Bi be the behavior of
mining node i. Bi = 1 when it is malicious and Bi = 0
when it is honest and nm =
∑nmn
i=1 Bi. Bi follows Binomial
distribution, i.e., Bi ∼ B(nmn, pm), where pm  [0, 1] is the
probability that Bi = 1. The reason for considering Binomial
distribution is because it has only two possible outcomes for
a discrete random number [54]. So, we can define one of the
outcomes as malicious and another as honest. µm = pmnmn
and µh = (1 − pm)nmn represent the mean number of
malicious and honest nodes, respectively.
Fig. 3: Distribution of Call Compensation.
D. Incentive Distribution Mechanism
As a compensation of causing an incident, the originator
pays a credit known as Call Compensation. Assuming that a
message is successfully validated, as shown in Fig. 3, Call
Compensation, at each direction, consists of CCmn, which is
equally distributed among honest mining nodes at nhop = 1,
and CCr, which is equally distributed among relay nodes at
nhop = {1, 2, .., nmaxhop }, in case a message is validated as true.
Otherwise, CCr is transferred to regulation authorities as a
penalty charge. If the message is successfully validated, the
utility of a mining node i, Umni , after taking part in a PoQF
consensus at nhop = 1 is given as
Umni =

CCmn
nh
, if Bi = 0 and message is true,
CCmn
nh
− TC, if Bi = 0 and message is false,
−TC, if Bi = 1 and message is true,
0, if Bi = 1 and message is false,
(5)
where TC > 0 is the Transaction Charge paid by mining
node i only when it votes that a message is false. It is later
paid to the relay node which generates the last keyblock
related to a particular incident. The motivation of introducing
TC is to discourage malicious false votes and promote fast
dissemination of true message in case of emergency. The
values of CCmn, CCr and TC are updated by edge computing
servers. The utility of a relay node, Uri , is given as
Uri =

CCr
nmaxhop
, if nhop ≤ nmaxhop and message is true,
nmTC, if nhop > nmaxhop and message is true,
nhTC, if nhop = 1 and message is false,
(6)
It is worth noting that a mining node i at nhop = 1 selected
as relay will earn a cumulative utility of Umni + U
r
i . A relay
node records transactions related to Umni in the keyblock at
nhop = 1. For nhop > 1, the corresponding relay node records
transaction related to Uri of previous hop. The message is
disseminated until nhop ≤ nmaxhop and PoQF is repeated until
nhop ≤ nmaxhop + 1, because the last relay node at nmaxhop + 1
records Uri of relay node at n
max
hop . As an incentive, it gains
the reward of nmTC and records this transaction itself. The
summary of incentive distribution among mining and relay
nodes is shown in Table IV.
IV. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security
1) Failure in Validation: We define the term Failure in
Validation, FV , as the probability that the original validity
7TABLE IV: Incentives distribution among nodes when mes-
sage is successfully validated.
Incentive Bi nhop True Message False Message
Umni
0 1 CCmn
nh
CCmn
nh
− TC
1 1 −TC 0
Uri 0
1 CCr
nmax
hop
nhTC
≤ nmaxhop CCrnmax
hop
0
> nmaxhop nmTC 0
of a message is inverted after PoQF consensus at nhop = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume the probability that
an originator generates a false message, i.e., the originator is
malicious, is pm and the probability of true message generation
is 1− pm. Therefore, FV can be expressed as
FV = pmFVfalse + (1− pm)FVtrue, (7)
where FVfalse and FVtrue denote Failure in Validation of
false and true message, respectively. FVfalse occurs when a
malicious mining node receives at least nth microblocks with
malicious votes to mark an originally false message as true.
Therefore, FVfalse can be given as
FVfalse = pmPr(nm ≥ nth). (8)
FVtrue occurs when an honest mining node does not receive
nth microblocks with honest votes to validate an originally
true message and can be expressed as
FVtrue = 1− (1− pm)Pr(nh ≥ nth). (9)
Bringing (8) and (9) into (7) gives
FV = 1−pm+p2mPr(nm ≥ nth)−(1−pm)2Pr(nh ≥ nth).
(10)
Using tail inequalities for Binomial distribution [55], we have
the following propositions.
Proposition 2: The upper bound of Pr(nx ≥ nth), where
x = m or h can be given as
Pr(nx ≥ nth)UB =
{
e
− (nth−µx)2µx+nth , if nth ≥ µx,
1, otherwise,
Proof: See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3: The lower bound of Pr(nx ≥ nth), where
x = m or h can be given as
Pr(nx ≥ nth)LB =
{
1− e− (µx−nth)
2
2µx , if 0 ≤ nth ≤ µx,
0, otherwise,
Proof: See Appendix B.2.
By applying Proposition 2 and 3 in (10), the upper and
lower bounds of FV , FV UB and FV LB can be derived as
FV UB = 1− pm + p2mPr(nm ≥ nth)UB
− (1− pm)2Pr(nh ≥ nth)LB ,
(11)
FV LB = 1− pm + p2mPr(nm ≥ nth)LB
− (1− pm)2Pr(nh ≥ nth)UB .
(12)
The expanded forms of (11) and (12) under a varying range of
nth can be seen in Appendix B.3.The role of nth in decreasing
Fig. 4: Potential fork situation.
Fig. 5: Flowchart of actions to resolve fork.
FV is described in Appendix B.4. Edge computing servers
optimize the value of nth for minimizing FV .
2) Resolving forks: In the proposed blockchchain, a fork
may be created as shown in Fig. 4 when two keyblocks are
generated by different relay nodes at the same hop. Forks
occur when two or more nodes fulfill both conditions of
becoming a relay node, which are defined in Section III. The
flowchart of actions by a node in case of fork occurrence is
shown in Fig. 5. If the keyblock by relay node i marks the
message as false and the keyblock by relay node j marks the
message as true, then the message dissemination is continued
and new blocks are linked with the keyblock generated by
relay node j. If both nodes show the same validity and
QFi = QFj , the timestamps of both keyblocks are checked
and the keyblock with the earlier timestamp is considered
valid. However, if QFi > QFj , then new blocks are added
in continuation with the keyblock generated by relay node i,
regardless of the timestamp of relay node j. The motivation
behind selecting the keyblock on the basis of QFi instead of
timestamp for blockchain extension is to discourage a possible
cheating attempt by mining node j to become a relay node
despite having QFj < QFi. Cheating by manipulating QFi
is difficult, as it is based on position and velocity of nodes
which are shared through regular beacon message exchange
and a cheating attempt can be easily detected and reported
to concerned authority. In presence of forks, edge computing
servers store the longest chain only.
3) Game Theory Analysis of Incentive Distribution Mech-
anism: We apply the game theory to analyze the impact of
the proposed incentive distribution mechanism on actions of
mining nodes at nhop = 1 and evaluate the security of PoQF
against nothing-at-stake and colluding attack by mining nodes.
a) Players: This game has nmn players out of which nh
are honest and nm are malicious. All players follow PoQF
consensus as mining nodes and are located at nhop = 1.
b) Action: Every player has two possible actions, honest,
H , or malicious, M .
c) Utilities: The payoff matrix in Table V shows
(Ui, Uy), if FV does not occur after PoQF at nhop = 1.
8TABLE V: Payoff Matrix (Ui, Uy), where Ui=Utility of min-
ing node i with the highest QFi and Uy=Utility of any other
mining node at nhop = 1.
(a) True Message
Any other mining node
H M
Mining node i H (CCmn
nh
+ CCr
nmax
hop
, (CCmn
nh
+ CCr
nmax
hop
,
with the CCmn
nh
) −TC)
highest QFi M (−TC, CCmnnh ) (−TC,−TC)
(b) False Message
Any other mining node
H M
Mining node i H (CCmn
nh
+ (nh − 1)TC, ((nh − 1)TC,
with the CCmn
nh
− TC) 0)
highest QFi M (0, CCmnnh − TC) (0, 0)
We present the following analysis of our incentive
distribution mechanism.
Lemma 2: Playing honest is the best response action of a
mining node, if CCmn ≥ nhTC.
Proof: As shown in Table V, if TC ≥ CCmnnh and the
message is false, playing honest will result in Uy ≤ 0 which
will be motivated to play maliciously. On the contrary, if
TC ≤ CCmnnh , it makes Uy ≥ 0 which will motivate the
mining nodes to play honestly. Therefore, to make honest as
the best response action of mining nodes, it is required that
TC ≤ CCmnnh or CCmn ≥ nhTC.
Proposition 4: The action set (H,H) is both Pareto-optimal
and Nash equilibrium and prevents nothing-at-stake attack.
Proof: From the payoff matrix in Table V, we can see
that no player can get the maximum utility by deviating
from the action set (H,H), provided that Lemma 2 is
fulfilled. In both true and false message cases, all mining
nodes can get the highest payoff by playing honestly only.
Therefore, the action set (H,H) is both Pareto-optimal and
Nash equilibrium of this game. The utilities of players will
be at risk by playing maliciously, and therefore they will
not be motivated to generate a keyblock without message
validation which happens in nothing-at-stake attack [45].
Theorem 2: A mining node cannot increase its expected
utility sum by colluding with its malicious neighbors if
nhTC ≤ CCmn ≤ nmCCrnmaxhop (nh−nm) and pm ≤ 0.5.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Thus the incentive distribution mechanism is collusion resis-
tant if edge computing servers adjust the values of CCmn,
CCr and nmaxhop such that Theorem 2 is fulfilled.
B. Validation Latency and Throughput
The MAC throughput in bit/second is defined in [56] as
λMAC = pt · psuc · LTavg , where pt = 2W+2 is the average
transmission probability of a node, W is the contention
window size, psuc is the probability of success transmission, L
is the average length of a packet and Tavg is the average length
of a time slot in Distributed Coordination Function (DCF).
psuc = ntr · pt · (1 − pt)ntr−1, where ntr is the number of
nodes contending the channel for transmission. According to
IEEE 802.11 standard [56], Tavg is
Tavg = pidle · Tslot + psuc · Tsuc + pcol · Tcol, (13)
where Tslot is the unit time slot in DCF scheme, pidle =
(1 − pt)ntr and pcol = 1 − pidle − psuc are the probabilities
of a node encountering an idle slot and collided transmission
respectively, Tsuc and Tcol are average time for success and
collided transmission respectively and are given as
Tcol = TRTS + TDIFS + Tslot, (14)
Tsuc = TRTS + TDIFS + TCTS + TACK
+3TSIFS + 4Tslot+
L
C
,
(15)
where TDIFS and TSIFS are time intervals for DCF In-
terframe space (DIFS) and Short Interframe Space (SIFS)
respectively, TRTS , TCTS and TACK are pre-specified time
intervals reserved for DCF related operations and C is the
average transmission rate among nodes. As λMAC is defined
in bit/second, the average time consumption, TMB , to success-
fully transmit a vote in a microblock of length L bits is
TMB =
L(bits)
λMAC(bit/second)
=
Tavg
pt · psuc . (16)
TMB varies with ntr only if W , L, Tslot, Tcol and Tsuc are
considered as fixed value for all transmitting mining nodes. As
1 ≤ ntr ≤ nmn, we consider two boundaries for TMB , i.e.,
T 1MB with ntr = 1 and T
nmn
MB with ntr = nmn. Therefore,
TminMB = min(T
1
MB , T
nmn
MB ) and T
max
MB = max(T
1
MB , T
nmn
MB ).
Considering a fixed transmission range and a homogeneous
distribution for all nodes, we can assume that nneigh is
statistically the same for every node. According to Propo-
sition 1, nneigh − QFi can be considered as the ranking
of mining node i to announce its microblock. In this way,
node i with a large QFi can have less validation time before
announcing a microblock. An edge computing server provides
τi bounds to be followed by mining nodes by considering
TMB as the time required by a mining node to successfully
transmit a microblock. The lower bound of τi is given as
aτi = T
min
MB (nneigh − QFi) and the upper bound of τi is
given as bτi = T
max
MB (nneigh −QFi).
For nmn microblocks, the total time consumption
(or validation latency), Tdelay, can be in the range
TminMB · nmn ≤ Tdelay ≤ TmaxMB · nmn. A mining node i
with the highest QFi becomes a relay node as soon as
it receives at least nth microblocks and does not need to
wait for receiving all nmn microblocks. Therefore, Tdelay
is reduced for small nth and we can find lower and upper
bounds of Tdelay when a message is successfully validated
by an honest node at nhop = 1.
Proposition 5: TLBdelay = TminMB · nth.
Proof: Tdelay is the minimum when a relay node receives
first nth consecutive microblocks with same votes immediately
following the incident message.
9Proposition 6: TUBdelay = TmaxMB · (nth + pmnmn).
Proof: The maximum number of microblocks with
malicious votes is pmnmn. Tdelay will be the maximum if
an honest relay node receives all pmnmn microblocks before
receiving nth honest microblocks.
A keyblock is generated by a relay node after the message
validation. Therefore, the throughput in terms of number of
keyblocks generated per second can be estimated as
λKB =
1
Tdelay + Teyp
, (17)
where Teyp is the time required to encrypt a keyblock.
C. Asymptotic Complexities
In this subsection, we compare the scalability of various
consensus algorithms by analyzing latency complexity, i.e., the
time consumption required to confirm a transaction, security
complexity, i.e., the minimum number of malicious nodes to
control consensus, and communication complexity, i.e., the
number of exchange messages required to validate a trans-
action. Without loss of generality, we derive the asymptotic
latency, security and communication complexity of various
consensus algorithms in Table VI in terms of number of
nodes participating in mining competition, nmn and consensus
parameter, κ, which is unique to each algorithm. κ refers to
the difficulty level of hash puzzle in PoW, synchronization
level in PoS, waiting time in PoET and number of minimum
votes required in voting based algorithms (PBFT and PoQF).
Standard mathematical notations are used in Table VI, i.e.,
Ω(.), O(.) and Θ(.) denote the order of at least, at most and
exactly respectively. Table VI shows that κ affects the latency
in PoW, PoS and PoET. Despite the fast consensus of PoS,
a strong synchronization among edge computing resources is
needed for efficient running [58]. Latency of PoET depends
on the length of waiting time which follows a fixed probability
distribution. PoQF has to wait for a threshold number of votes,
which has an impact on latency but its scalability does not rely
on large computation power or storage capacity of mobile edge
nodes. Similar to PoS, synchronization among edge computing
servers and mobile edge nodes is needed in PoQF, but the
requirement is independent of nmn. PoET offers the least
security and can be controlled by only a small fraction of
malicious nodes [9]. According to Theorem 3, PoQF is secure
against the collusion attack when pm ≤ 0.5. It provides the
same security as PoW which is better than PBFT but worse
than PoS [59]. In communication complexity, PoW, PoS and
PoET are more efficient than PoQF, since they do not require
multiple message exchanges. Despite the voting nature of
PoQF, it has lower communication complexity than PBFT.
Moreover, in VANETs, nmn cannot be increased beyond a
certain threshold due to limited number of nodes within a
transmission range R and dneighmin , which makes PoQF scalable
and applicable in V2V communications.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
blockchain and PoQF consensus using OMNeT++ integrated
TABLE VI: Comparison of Asymptotic Complexities.
Consensus Latency Security Communication
PoW Θ(κ)[58] Ω
(
nmn
2
)
[60] Θ(1)[58]
PoS Ω(κ)[58] Ω
(
2nmn
3
)
[59] Θ(1)[58]
PoET Ω(κ)[9] Ω
(
loglognmn
lognmn
)
[9] Θ(1)[9]
PBFT nmnO(1)[58] Ω
(
nmn−1
2
)
[35] O(n2mn)[10]
PoQF κO(1) Ω
(
nmn
2
)
O(nmn)
TABLE VII: Simulation Parameters.
Parameters Values Parameters Values
Simulation Time 200 s Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Size of area 10 km×10 km Encryption SHA-256
Beacon frequency 0.1 s Pnoise -99 dBm
γ 50, 75, 100, 125 R 250 m
150, 175, 200 α 3
nodes/km2 β 8 dB
Mobility model Freeway dminneigh 12 m
Average velocity 40 km/hr dminhop 100 m
L 756 bytes W 32
TRTS 53µs TDIFS 58µs
TCTS 37µs TSIFS 32µs
TACK 37µs Tslot 13µs
Teyp 3332.11µs C 6 Mbps
with SUMO (Simulation of Urban Mobility) 1. The simulation
parameters listed in Table VII align with other VANET appli-
cations [15], [56], [57], [61]. Since nmn are neighbor nodes
of a sender s, nmn ≤ 40 will be considered when nodes are
homogeneously distributed with a maximum of 200 nodes/km2
and it is a reasonable assumption of maximum number of
vehicles within a transmission range when the safe distance
between nodes are maintained on road [62]. Evaluation results
are averaged over 100 simulation runs.
Fig. 6 shows FV with respect to nmn at different pm and
nth. Two different values of pm are chosen to show the results
at both low (pm < 0.5) and high (pm > 0.5) densities of
malicious mining nodes presented in the network. As shown
in Fig. 6 (a), FV with pm = 0.3 is lower than FV with
pm = 0.7 when nth = 3, i.e., nth ≤ µm. It shows that
a low nth is suitable only for low pm when honest nodes
are in majority. On the contrary, as shown in Fig. 6 (b), FV
with pm = 0.3 is higher than FV with pm = 0.7 when
nth = nmn, i.e., nth > µm. This is because when nth = nmn
both malicious and honest mining nodes are unable to finalize
consensus within the maximum allowable latency of 1s and the
message is marked as false. With pm = 0.3, the probability of
false message occurrence is lower than that of true message
occurrence and it is hard to collect nth = nmn honest votes
to validate a true message. In this case, FV UB ≈ 1 − pm
depicts the worst case scenario of maximum probability of
true message generation which will be marked as false. With
pm = 0.7, the probability of true message occurrence is lower
than that of false message occurrence. FV does not occur
when both honest and malicious nodes are unable to collect
1Source code is available at https://github.com/ferheenayaz/PoQF.
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(a) nth = 3 (b) nth = nmn
Fig. 6: FV with respect to nmn.
(a) CCr = 100, TC = 0.5, nmaxhop = 10 (b) CCr = 200, TC = 0.5, n
max
hop = 10 (c) CCr = 200, TC = 0.1, n
max
hop = 6
Fig. 7: Setting up CCr, TC and nmaxhop for collusion resistant incentive distribution mechanism.
(a) pm = 0.2 (b) pm = 0.4 (c) pm = 0.6 (d) pm = 0.8
Fig. 8: Tdelay with respect to nmn.
Fig. 9: λKB with respect to pm.
votes for a false message. It only occurs when a true message
is not validated. As shown in Fig. 6 (b), FV LB ≈ 1−pm with
pm = 0.7, depicts the percentage of true messages which are
not validated by PoQF. The dependence of nth on pm is further
discussed in Appendix B.4. If pm in the network is known,
VEC technique can achieve a low FV even with high values
of pm by adjusting nth accordingly.
Fig. 7 shows the impact of parameters: CCr, TC and nmaxhop ,
on the collusion resistance feature of incentive distribution
mechanism. According to Theorem 3, the incentive distribu-
tion mechanism is collusion resistant if nhTC ≤ CCmn ≤
nmCCr
nmaxhop (nh−nm) and pm ≤ 0.5. As Bi follows Binomial distri-
bution, it can be assumed that nm ≈ µm and nh ≈ µh. Based
on this assumption, Fig. 7 (a) and (b) show that the incentive
distribution mechanism cannot be collusion resistant for every
nmn, pm under the fixed CCr, TC and nmaxhop . However, in
Fig. 7 (c), when CCr = 200, TC = 0.1 and nmaxhop = 6,
nhTC ≤ nmCCrnmaxhop (nh−nm) is satisfied for every nmn(10, 40)
and pm(0, 0.5). Therefore, for a collusion resistant incentive
distribution mechanism, it is required that the edge computing
servers should adjust the combination of these parameters with
varying nmn and pm, such that it is possible to choose CCmn
within the boundaries defined by Theorem 3. Apart from the
security reason, a low nmaxhop is also favorable for successful
message delivery, as the failure of multi-hop connectivity in
VANETs increases with the number of hops [63].
Fig. 8 shows Tdelay of successful message validation with
respect to nmn at different values of pm with nth = µm + 1.
It can be seen that Tdelay increases with pm because of
more frequent generation of microblocks by malicious nodes.
Fig. 8 (c) and (d) show that TUBdelay exceeds the maximum
allowable latency requirement of 1s [47] when pm ≥ 0.6
and nmn ≥ 30. At pm = 0.8 and nmn > 35, the mining
nodes are unable to finalize consensus within 1s. Fig. 9 shows
λKB of PoQF consensus at various nmn and pm. The highest
11
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Fig. 10: Comparison of PoQF with PoS and PoET with nth = µm + 1.
Fig. 11: Values of aτi and bτi .
λKB achieved is 11 keyblock/s at pm = 0.1 and nmn = 15
and the lowest is 0.9 keyblock/s at pm ≥ 0.8 and nmn = 35,
which means that at higher nmn and pm, PoQF with λKB < 1
keyblock/s may not be able to generate block within the limit
of maximum allowable latency of 1s. This shows that our
proposed blockchain exhibits better performance specifically
at lower values of pm and nmn. λKB can be improved by
offloading computations required for encrypting a keyblock to
a nearby edge computing server which have high computation
power, thereby reducing Teyp, as suggested in [64].
Fig. 10 compares the performance of PoQF with PoET and
PoS. In Fig. 10 (a), FV of PoQF is compared with PoET and
PoS at different values of pm and nmn, while nth is fixed
at µm + 1, as it results in low FV for all values of pm. We
implement PoET such that its waiting time is uncontrolled by
VEC. Each node generates a random number between 0 to 1
s to determine its waiting time for collecting microblocks. It
shows that FV of PoQF and PoET are closing to each other
at low pm. For high values of pm, an honest node i with
the highest QFi is unable to collect sufficient microblocks
from honest mining nodes within a random waiting time of
PoET and therefore its FV rises with pm at a higher rate than
PoQF. In the reputation based PoS, a node is considered honest
if its reputation exceeds a certain threshold. We randomly
assign a reputation value to nodes on a scale of 0 to 100,
thus the probability of reputation falling below a threshold of
50 is defined as pm. We implement PoS such that a malicious
relay node only forwards the message from a malicious sender
and an honest relay node only forwards the message from
an honest sender. On an average, PoQF reduces FV by
11% and 15%, as compared to PoS and PoET, respectively.
Fig. 10 (b) compares the number of forks created by PoQF,
PoS and PoET consensus. Although solutions to resolve forks
are discussed in Section IV, a blockchain consensus should be
able to avoid creation of forks in order to control discrepancies.
In PoQF, node i with the highest QFi is most likely to
announce its microblock prior to other mining nodes. In this
way, node j with QFj < QFi cannot become a relay node,
if votes of both nodes are the same. This is how creation of
forks is reduced in the proposed consensus. We implement
PoS consensus by selecting a relay node on the basis of
the highest reputation which is randomly generated from 0
to 100 in the simulation. A fork appears when two nodes
with same reputation simultaneously become relay node. In
PoET, the time to announce microblock is not controlled by
VEC. Therefore, node j with lower QFj becomes a relay
node before receiving a microblock from node i even though
QFi > QFj . In that case, a fork appears if both node i and
node j generate keyblocks. It is noted that the number of forks
in PoS is equal or lower than PoQF when nmn ≤ 20. Due
to unreliable nature of vehicle connectivity, there remains a
possibility of fork occurrence when an announced microblock
by node i is not received by node j. It usually happens when
mining nodes are in distance and beyond the transmission
range of each other. This is why a low node density, ultimately
leading to low nmn, may result in a higher or equal number
of forks created by PoQF as compared to PoS. Fig. 10 (c)
compares Tdelay of successful message validation consumed
by PoQF, PoET and PoS. By using PoET, the mining node
i is allowed to announce its microblock at a random time
irrespective of its QFi. On an average, Tdelay of PoET is 68 ms
higher than PoQF. However, the difference is larger at lower
pm. Since τi is independent of QFi in PoET, node j with
lower QFj may announce its microblock earlier than node
i with QFi > QFj and node i might have to wait longer.
This waiting time is reduced in PoQF by utilization of VEC.
However, with large pm, an honest mining node i with the
highest QFi has to wait longer in PoQF for receiving nth
honest microblocks. It is because the frequency of malicious
microblocks generation is increased with a large pm. Hence the
Tdelay difference between PoQF and PoET becomes smaller.
Tdelay of PoS is independent of pm and increases with nmn.
It is the smallest because it only consumes time in relay node
selection, while the voting time is eliminated by the reputation
based message validation.
Fig. 11 displays aτi and bτi which are governed by edge
computing servers to regulate τi, generated by a mining node
i. It shows that aτi and bτi reduce with an increasing QFi
and therefore τi leads to less waiting time for potential relay
nodes. Due to homogeneous distribution of nodes, nneigh is
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Fig. 12: Average success rate with respect to speed.
the same for every node in a network. Therefore, deliberately
reducing τi by node i is bounded by the limit of aτi , which is
known to every node in a network. Such attempt can be easily
detected and reported to concerned authority.
Fig. 12 shows the success rate of transmitting a true
message under different maximum speeds of a mining node.
For nhop > 1, PoQF consensus is only used for relay node
selection since the message is already validated at nhop = 1,
and therefore, the transmission success rate is independent of
pm. It shows that the success rate is falling with increasing
speed, specifically for small nmn. This is because a small
nmn depicts a low traffic density, so the nodes are likely
to attain their maximum speeds and may lose connectivity
before finalizing a consensus to select a relay node. In order
to speed up consensus, a possible solution is that the edge
computing servers reduce nth when nhop > 1. At nhop > 1,
the consensus only depends on the highest QFi and does not
require message validation. Since the mining node i sends its
microblock earlier than the mining node j with QFj < QFi,
it is not necessary for the mining node i to wait until QFj is
received. It is noted that in case of an incident or traffic jam, a
high speed is not likely to be attained in the affected area and
therefore, it is not recommended to reduce nth at nhop = 1,
as it may result in large FV .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a blockchain based on
PoQF consensus algorithm for message dissemination in VEC
networks. The theoretical performance of proposed consen-
sus is evaluated by deriving bounds on failure and latency
in message validation, throughput of block generation and
asymptotic latency, security and communication complexity.
Moreover, an incentive distribution mechanism to promote
positive cooperation and discourage malicious behavior of
nodes has been presented and analyzed using game theory.
From the simulation analysis, the proposed blockchain
shows 11% reduction in FV by PoQF as compared to reputa-
tion based PoS. As a trade-off, it results in increased validation
latency. Specifically due to VEC, PoQF is 15% more secure
and 68 ms faster in validating a message as compared to PoET.
Furthermore, PoQF results in less number of forks than PoET
and PoS. Similar to PoW, PoQF is vulnerable to malicious
nodes if they compose more than 50% of mining group but
its performance is not dependent on the presence of at least
2f + 1 mining nodes as in PBFT.
In the future work, we aim to reduce latency by proposing
an alternative to voting solution for message validation. An
adaptive and intelligent blockchain can be designed to achieve
higher throughput with varying number of mining nodes.
APPENDIX A
1) Appendix A.1: The PDF of interference nodes at location
(X,Y ) within the area piR2 is defined in [14] as 1piR2 .
Therefore, E(dt2j,k) can be calculated as
E(dt2j,k) =
∫
(X2 + Y 2)f(X,Y )dXdY. (18)
Bringing X = zcosφ and Y = zsinφ into (18) leads to
E(dt2j,k) =
∫ R
dminneigh
∫ 2pi
0
z2
piR2
dφdz =
2
3R2
(R3 − dminneigh
3
).
(19)
2) Appendix A.2: Since dt2i,j = d
t1
i,j + ∆d
∆t
i,j , we find the
probability of ∆d∆ti,j ≤ dx − dt1i,j . If dt1i,j ≤ dx, the actual
required communication distance, ∆d∆ti,j can be calculated as
in [50]
∆d∆ti,j =
{
dx + d
t1
i,j , Case 1
dx − dt1i,j , Case 2
(20)
where Case 1 is either of the following
• node i and node j are moving towards each other
• node i is in front of node j, both moving in same
direction, and vi < vj
• node j is in front of node i, both moving in same
direction, and vi > vj
and Case 2 is either of the following
• node i and node j are moving away from each other
• node i is in front of node j, both moving in same
direction, and vi > vj
• node j is in front of node i, both moving in same
direction, and vi < vj
Therefore, PDF of ∆d∆ti,j can be defined as
f(∆d∆ti,j ) =
1√
2pi(σ2i + σ
2
j )∆t
3
e
− (∆d
∆t
i,j )
2
2(σ2
i
+σ2
j
)∆t3 . (21)
Consider both acceleration and deceleration, Cumulative Den-
sity Function (CDF) can be calculated as
F (∆d∆ti,j ) =
∫ ∆d∆ti,j
−∆d∆ti,j
f(∆d∆ti,j )d(∆d
∆t
i,j ), (22)
As F (∆d∆ti,j ) = Pr(d
t2
i,j ≤ dx) = Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β),
Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β) =
1
2
[
erf
(
∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i + σ
2
j )∆t
3
)
−erf
(
−∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i + σ
2
j )∆t
3
)]
.
(23)
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Otherwise, if dt1i,j > dx, the actual required communication
distance ∆d∆ti,j can be calculated as
∆d∆ti,j =
{
dt1i,j − dx, Case 1
dt1i,j + dx, Case 2
(24)
where Case 1 and Case 2 are the same as defined in (20).
As dt1i,j > dx, for d
t2
i,j ≤ dx, we need ∆d∆ti,j < 0. Therefore,
we calculate 1 − f(∆d∆ti,j ) and ultimately Pr(dt2i,j ≤ dx) =
Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β) is expressed as
Pr(SINRt2i,j ≥ β) = 1−
1
2
[
erf
(
∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i + σ
2
j )∆t
3
)
−erf
(
−∆d∆ti,j√
2(σ2i + σ
2
j )∆t
3
)]
.
(25)
APPENDIX B
1) Appendix B.1: According to the multiplicative form of
Chernoff bound [55], Pr(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
2+δ , where X
is a sum of independent Binomial variables with mean µ and
δ > 0. Bringing µ = µx and (1 + δ)µ = nth, gives
Pr(nx ≥ nth) ≤
{
e
− (nth−µx)2µx+nth , if nth ≥ µx,
1, otherwise.
(26)
2) Appendix B.2: For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, Chernoff bound [55]
states that Pr(X ≤ (1−δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
2 , which can be rewritten
as Pr(X ≥ (1− δ)µ) ≥ 1− e− δ
2µ
2 . Therefore,
Pr(nx ≥ nth) ≥
{
1− e− (µx−nth)
2
2µx , if 0 ≤ nth ≤ µx,
0, otherwise.
(27)
3) Appendix B.3: Using (10), (26) and (27), we get
FV ≤
1− pm + p2m − (1− pm)2(1− e−
(µh−nth)2
2µh ),
if nth < min(µm, µh),
1− pm + p2me−
(nth−µm)2
µm+nth − (1− pm)2(1− e−
(µh−nth)2
2µh ),
if µm ≤ nth ≤ µh,
1− pm + p2m, if µh < nth < µm,
1− pm + p2me−
(nth−µm)2
µm+nth , if nth > max(µm, µh).
(28)
and FV ≥
1− pm + p2m(1− e−
(µm−nth)2
2µm )− (1− pm)2,
if nth < min(µm, µh),
pm − p2m, if µm ≤ nth ≤ µh,
1− pm + p2m(1− e−
(µm−nth)2
2µm )− (1− pm)2e−
(nth−µh)2
µh+nth ,
if µh < nth < µm,
1− pm − (1− pm)2e−
(nth−µh)2
µh+nth , if nth > max(µm, µh).
(29)
4) Appendix B.4: As we know that, 0 < e−x ≤ 1 for
any real valued x and pm[0, 1], it can be deduced from (29)
that FV LB is the minimum when µm ≤ nth ≤ µh, which
is only possible for pm ≤ 0.5. For pm > 0.5, the minimum
FV LB can be obtained when nth > µm. To find the minimum
FV UB , we compare its value at two conditions of (28), i.e.,
nth > max(µm, µh) and nth < min(µm, µh).
1− pm + p2me−
(nth−µm)2
µm+nth < 1− pm
+p2m − (1− pm)2(1− e−
(µh−nth−1)2
2µh ),
(30)
Assuming that p2me
− (nth−µm)2µm+nth ≈ (1 − pm)2(1 −
e
− (µh−nth−1)22µh ) ≈ 0, (30) leads to pm > 12 . It proves that
nth > µm results in the minimum FV UB for pm > 12 .
APPENDIX C
Let ncp colluding players form a group to mark a true
message as false or a false message as true with a probability
pcp. The expected utility sum of colluding players as mining
nodes, E(Umncp ), if they mark a true message as false is
E(Umncp ) = pcp
(
CCmn
nm
ncp−ncpTC
)
+(1−pcp)
(
CCmn
nh
ncp
)
.
(31)
The probability that one of the colluding players is selected
as a relay node if the colluding attack is successful is ncp/nm
and if colluding players play honestly is ncp/nh. Therefore,
the total expected utility sum E(Ucp) is given as
E(Ucp) = pcp
(
CCmn
nm
ncp − ncpTC +
(ncp
nm
)
nmTC
)
+ (1− pcp)
(
CCmn
nh
ncp +
(ncp
nh
) CCr
nmaxhop
)
,
(32)
To prevent collusion, we want E(Ucp) ≤ E(U ′cp), where U ′cp
represents the utility of colluding players playing honestly, i.e.,
pcp
(
CCmn
nm
ncp
)
+ (1− pcp)
(
CCmn
nh
ncp +
(ncp
nh
) CCr
nmaxhop
)
≤ CCmn
nh
ncp +
(ncp
nh
) CCr
nmaxhop
,
(33)
which leads towards the condition, CCmn ≤ nmCCrnmaxhop (nh−nm) .
If CCmn ≥ 0, this condition can only be fulfilled when
nh ≥ nm, i.e., when pm ≤ 0.5. Similarly, if colluding players
attempt to mark a false message as true, then E(Ucp) is given
as,
E(Ucp) = pcp
(
CCmn
nm
ncp +
(ncp
nm
) CCr
nmaxhop
)
+ (1− pcp)
(
CCmn
nh
ncp − ncpTC +
(ncp
nh
)
nhTC
)
.
(34)
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To prevent collusion, we require E(Ucp) ≤ E(U ′cp), which
leads towards the condition CCmn ≥ nhCCrnmaxhop (nm−nh) . Com-
bining the condition of Lemma 2, we want, CCmn ≥
max
(
nhTC,
nhCCr
nmaxhop (nm−nh)
)
. For pm ≤ 0.5, CCr > 0 and
nmaxhop > 0, we always get
nhCCr
nmaxhop (nm−nh) ≤ 0 and nhTC ≥
nhCCr
nmaxhop (nm−nh) . Therefore, we can prove that the incentive
distribution mechanism is collusion resistant if nhTC ≤
CCmn ≤ nmCCrnmaxhop (nh−nm) and p ≤ 0.5.
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